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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable seizure
continues beyond legal process so as to allow a
malicious prosecution claim based upon the Fourth
Amendment.
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1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
I am a member of the Illinois Bar and the
Julius Kreeger Professor Emeritus at the
University of Chicago Law School. My principal
fields of study are criminal law and criminal
procedure, subjects I have taught for fifty years. My
interest in this case is simply that of a friend of this
Court. 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This brief argues that the seizure of Elijah
Manuel began when he was unlawfully arrested
and ended when he was released forty-eight days
later. The Seventh Circuit’s contrary view—that
the Fourth Amendment “falls out of the picture”
when legal process issues—is inconsistent with the
amendment’s text, the Framers’ understanding of
this amendment, and many of this Court’s
decisions. The principal object of the Fourth
Amendment was to outlaw abuses of legal process
and to prevent the sorts of oppressive searches and
seizures that judges previously had authorized. The
Seventh Circuit’s view is also inconsistent with
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), which holds
that the Fourth Amendment protects against
unwarranted detention throughout the pretrial
Pursuant to Rule 37.6, I declare that no counsel for a
party has authored this brief in whole or in part and that no
one other than my co-counsel and I has made any monetary
contribution to the preparation and submission of this brief.
Letters of consent to the filing of this brief have been lodged
with the Clerk of Court pursuant to Rule 37.3.
1
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period. Finally, the court’s view is inconsistent with
this Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence. Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335 (1985), and Kalina v. Fletcher, 522
U.S. 118 (1997), resolve the question presented by
this case, for they permit recovery for post-process
deprivations of liberty in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. This brief asks the Court to approve
the view of nine courts of appeals that wrongful
detention following the issuance of legal process
can violate the Fourth Amendment and give rise to
a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
PART I
BACKGROUND
To clarify the stakes in Manuel’s case and the
legal context in which it arises, this introductory
Part reviews some procedural steps in a criminal
case, notes some requisites of a collateral challenge
to a judicial determination of probable cause,
describes the common law torts of false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution, and sets
forth the competing positions of the First, Second,
Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuits on the one hand and the Seventh and
Fifth Circuits on the other. This Part begins by
recounting some recent history and describing a
hypothetical case.
A.

RECENT EXONERATIONS
HYPOTHETICAL CASE

AND

A

According to the National Registry of
Exonerations, 1781 people convicted of crimes have
been exonerated by pardon, dismissal, or acquittal
since 1989. Official misconduct contributed to the

3
convictions of 923 (52%) of these people. The
National Registry of Exonerations, Percentage of
Exonerations by Contributing Factor, http://www.
law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerati
onsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx (last visited May
8, 2016).
In an astonishing number of cases, police
officers deliberately fabricated evidence to
implicate the innocent. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, An
Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police
Department’s Board of Inquiry Report on the
Rampart Scandal, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 545, 549
(2001) (describing the Rampart police scandal in
which numerous Los Angeles police officers framed
people by planting evidence and committing
perjury); Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of
Wrongful Convictions, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1133,
1139–41 (2013) (describing how the State of Texas
agreed to vacate nearly fifty convictions obtained
after undercover agent Tom Coleman falsely
claimed to have bought cocaine from more than 20
percent of the adult black residents of Tulia,
Texas); Duggan, “Sheetrock Scandal” Hits Dallas
Police; Cases Dropped, Officers Probed After
Cocaine “Evidence” Turns Out to be Fake, Wash.
Post, Jan. 18, 2002, at A12 (reporting the dismissal
of 39 cases in Dallas when material that police
laboratory testing allegedly had shown to be
cocaine was shown in fact to be ground-up
wallboard material).
Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging arrest
and detention in violation of the Fourth
Amendment may arise from circumstances like
those of the following hypothetical case:

4
On Day 1, Officer Rogue planted false evidence
and arrested Innocent Plaintiff. On Day 2, the
planted evidence persuaded a magistrate to find
probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest and to hold him
for trial. On Day 100, the false evidence convinced
a jury to convict Plaintiff, and a judge sentenced
him to ten years in prison. On Day 2500, the
Governor pardoned Innocent Plaintiff, declaring
that both his innocence and Officer Rogue’s
misconduct had been shown by overwhelming
evidence.
B.

THREE PERIODS OF DETENTION
FOLLOWING
A
WARRANTLESS
ARREST: WHY A RULING AGAINST
THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE MIGHT
LEAVE MANY VICTIMS OF FALSIFIED
EVIDENCE
WITH
NO
FEDERAL
REMEDY

The case before this Court differs from Innocent
Plaintiff’s in one respect. Elijah Manuel’s innocence
became clear and his detention ended prior to trial.
The prosecutor dismissed his case and he was
released after he had been held for forty-eight days,
dropped college courses he was unable to attend,
missed work, and saw his credit rating lowered
because he was unable to make payments on
student loans and other obligations. Manuel’s case,
unlike Innocent Plaintiff’s, does not pose the
question whether an unconstitutionally seized
person may recover damages for imprisonment
following conviction.
Nevertheless, it may aid the Court’s analysis to
take a broader view of the criminal process than

5
the present case requires. This section therefore
considers three periods of detention that may follow
an arrest without a warrant—(1) from arrest to a
judicial determination of probable cause, (2) from a
judicial determination of probable cause to
conviction by trial or guilty plea, and (3) from
conviction by trial or guilty plea to exoneration and
release.
As a result of decisions by this Court, the initial
period of detention is likely to be brief. Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975), holds that “the
Fourth
Amendment
requires
a
judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite
to extended restraint on liberty following arrest.” It
also holds that this “determination must be made
by a judicial officer either before or promptly after
arrest.” Id. at 125. County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991), holds that the
judicial determination of probable cause ordinarily
must be made within 48 hours of an arrest made
without a warrant.
Section 1983 entitles someone in Innocent
Plaintiff’s position to recover damages for the
unlawful detention that occurred in the first period
(the period before the judicial determination of
probable cause). See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
389–90 (2007). As a practical matter, however,
someone framed by the police often may be unable
to obtain this recovery. Until Innocent Plaintiff was
exonerated, no rational lawyer would have taken
his seemingly hopeless case. By the time he was

6
exonerated, if the statute of limitations had begun
to run at arraignment, the period for filing suit
probably would have passed. 2
Wallace holds that the statute of limitations
does begin to run at arraignment when a plaintiff
has presented only a “Fourth Amendment falsearrest claim.” 549 U.S. at 387 n.1 (“We expressly
limited our grant of certiorari to the Fourth
Amendment false-arrest claim.”); id. at 389–90
(holding that the false arrest claim accrued at the
time of arraignment). The decision also holds that,
although this plaintiff may not file suit while
imprisoned following his conviction, the statute of
limitations is not tolled during this period. Id. at
394–97. The Court, however, recognized that a
Fourth Amendment violation might extend beyond
arraignment into the second and third periods of
detention. See id. at 390 n.2 (“We have never
explored the contours of a Fourth Amendment
malicious-prosecution suit under § 1983 . . . and we
do not do so here.”).
The second period of detention—between a
determination of probable cause and a trial verdict
or other disposition—can be short (or even
This Court has held that the applicable statute of
limitations is the one governing personal injury actions in the
state courts. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276–79 (1985). In
most states, this statute sets the limitations period at two or
three years. See Nolo, Chart: Statutes of Limitations in All 50
States,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/statute-oflimitations-state-laws-chart-29941.html (last visited May 8,
2016).
2
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nonexistent
if
the
accused
is
released
unconditionally pending trial). But this period can
also be long. In 2013, 539 inmates of the Cook
County Jail had been held for more than two years
while awaiting trial, and forty had been held for
more than five years. See Thomas, Burke Criticizes
Pretrial Jailing, Extended Stays, Chicago Daily
Law Bulletin, Dec. 11, 2015, http://www.
chicagolawbulletin.com/Archives/2015/12/11/burkekeynote-12-11-15.aspx.
The
third
period—from
conviction
to
exoneration and release—is likely to be long. The
average time served by America’s wrongly
convicted, later exonerated prisoners was nine
years. The National Registry of Exonerations, Basic
Patterns,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/Basic-Patterns.aspx (last visited
May 8, 2016). A person framed by a police officer,
however, can sometimes obtain damages for
imprisonment during this final period without
securing a determination that the officer violated
the Fourth Amendment.
The officer may be liable for wrongful detention
during this last period because he participated in
the state’s failure to reveal exculpatory evidence.
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995). In some
circumstances, he may also be liable for the
knowing use of perjured testimony, for this use is
also a due process violation. Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103, 112–13 (1935). In addition, the malicious
initiation of a baseless prosecution may constitute a
due process violation when an adequate state

8
remedy for common law tort of malicious
prosecution is unavailable. See Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 281–86 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Newsome v. McCabe,
256 F.3d 747, 750–51 (7th Cir. 2001).
The due process rights just described are
limited, however, in ways that may block a § 1983
plaintiff framed by a police officer from obtaining a
federal remedy for wrongful detention in the second
and third periods:
1)

Although the Due Process Clause may
entitle a plaintiff to recover for malicious
prosecution when no adequate state
remedy is available, only one reported
decision appears ever to have held a state
remedy inadequate. See Julian v. Hanna,
732 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding
remedies inadequate when a state afforded
police officers absolutely immunity from
suit).

2)

An officer who himself gives perjured
testimony at trial or before a grand jury is
immune from suit for his perjury. Briscoe v.
LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983); Rehberg
v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1500 (2012).

3)

Brady’s disclosure requirements are
unlikely to provide a basis for recovery
when, as in this case, charges are
dismissed prior to trial. See LaFave et al.,
Criminal Procedure § 24.3, at 1147 (5th ed.
2009) (“[T]he Brady rule does not impose a
general requirement that the government
disclose prior to trial exculpatory evidence

9
that is material to the issue of guilt. Due
process requires only that disclosure of
exculpatory evidence be made in sufficient
time to permit defendant to make effective
use of that evidence at trial.”); Rogala v.
District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 55–56
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (publishing and endorsing
the district court’s opinion) (declaring that
a pretrial dismissal “ends the analysis”
because plaintiffs cannot show that an
officer’s failure to preserve evidence was
prejudicial).
4)

Brady also may provide no basis for
recovery when a wrongly accused plaintiff
has been acquitted at trial. See Bianchi v.
McQueen, No. 14–1635, ___ F.3d ___, 2016
WL 1213270, at *8 (7th Cir. Mar. 29, 2016)
(“A violation of Brady requires a showing of
prejudice, which can’t be made here
because the plaintiffs were acquitted.”).

5)

Brady may not supply a basis for recovery
even after conviction when a wrongly
accused person has pleaded guilty. See
Covey, Plea Bargaining Law After Lafler
and Frye, 51 Duq. L. Rev. 595, 601 (2013)
(“It is . . . unclear whether a prosecutor has
a
constitutional
duty
to
produce
exculpatory evidence . . . before a guilty
plea is entered.”); cf. United States v. Ruiz,
536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (holding that the
due process clause does not require
“preguilty plea disclosure of impeachment
information” while leaving open the

10
question whether the clause may require
the disclosure of other Brady material).
In all of these circumstances, the ability to
establish a Fourth Amendment violation may be
crucial. Holding that a Fourth Amendment
violation ends when a wrongly arrested plaintiff is
arraigned may leave a plaintiff without a federal
remedy for post-process detention even when he
has been framed by a police officer. 3
C.

TWO COMMON LAW TORTS

At both the time the Fourth Amendment was
ratified and the time § 1983 was enacted, the
common law would have allowed Innocent Plaintiff
to recover damages from Officer Rogue for the
entire period from his arrest to his release. At the
time the Fourth Amendment was ratified, however,
pleading requirements would have required
Plaintiff to bring two separate lawsuits to obtain
Even when recovery for detention in the second and
third periods is permitted, obtaining this recovery is difficult.
Following a judicial determination of probable cause, a § 1983
plaintiff can offer only two sorts of challenges. First, he can
allege that evidence presented to the judicial officer was both
false and essential to the determination of probable cause. To
prevail, the plaintiff must show that the police officer
deliberately falsified the critical evidence or presented it with
reckless disregard of the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154, 171 (1978). Second, the plaintiff can claim that, although
the police officer was truthful, the evidence he presented did
not establish probable cause. A plaintiff who makes a claim of
this sort can prevail only if “it is obvious that no reasonably
competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should
issue.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341.
3
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this recovery—one alleging false imprisonment and
the other alleging malicious prosecution. By 1871,
when § 1983 was enacted, many states had relaxed
these pleading requirements, allowing joinder of
the two claims.
As this Court explained in Wallace:
The sort of unlawful detention remediable
by the tort of false imprisonment is
detention without legal process . . . .
Thereafter, unlawful detention forms part
of the damages for the “entirely distinct”
tort of malicious prosecution, which
remedies detention accompanied, not by an
absence of legal process, but by wrongful
institution of legal process.
549 U.S. at 389–90; see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 484 (1994) (“[U]nlike the related cause of
action for false arrest or imprisonment, [the cause
of action for malicious prosecution] permits
damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal
process.”).
The torts described by the Court are centuries
old and grew out of different royal writs. The
appropriate form of action for false imprisonment
was trespass vi et armis, see 3 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries *138, and that for malicious
prosecution was trespass on the case. See id. at
*126–27. Establishing liability for malicious
prosecution required proof of two elements not
included in the action for false imprisonment—
malice and a termination of the proceedings in
favor of the accused. See D. Dobbs, The Law of
Torts §§ 433 and 434 (2000); Stewart v. Sonneborn,

12
98 U.S. 187, 192 (1878) (declaring that the plaintiff
must show that the defendant was “actuated in his
conduct by malice, or some improper or sinister
motive”); id. at 195 (“In every case of an action for a
malicious prosecution or suit, it must be averred
and proved that the proceeding instituted against
the plaintiff has failed.”). Both torts required a
showing that the defendant acted without probable
cause. See Harper, Malicious Prosecution, False
Imprisonment and Defamation, 15 Texas L. Rev.
157, 176 (1937). 4
A plaintiff who claimed that his arrest was
unlawful was required to choose between the two
causes of action. If the arrest had occurred without
a warrant, he could challenge its legality only in a
suit for false imprisonment. If the arrest had
occurred pursuant to a warrant, he could challenge
it only in a suit for malicious prosecution. The
issuance of an arrest warrant or other legal process
marked a sharp divide between the two actions.
See, e.g., Morgan v. Hughes, 100 Eng. Rep. 123,
125–26 (K.B. 1788) (“[A] justice of the peace, who
grants a warrant against a person accused, cannot

False imprisonment required proof of one element not
included in the action for malicious prosecution—
imprisonment. The wrongful institution of legal process was
actionable at common law even if the defendant had not been
seized or arrested. From an early date, however, actions for
malicious prosecution permitted the recovery of damages for
arrest and imprisonment that followed a false charge as well
as for the injury to reputation worked by the charge itself. See
Harper, supra, at 160 n.8 (collecting sources).
4
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be punished in an action of trespass, though the
accusation be false: but if, without any accusation,
and knowing the person not to be guilty, he grant
his warrant, on which the party is arrested, he is
liable to an action on the case by the person
unjustly accused.”); Stonehouse v. Elliot, 101 Eng.
Rep. 571, 571–72 (K.B. 1795) (holding that, because
a person falsely accused of theft had been brought
before a constable who could not initiate legal
proceedings, his suit should be for false
imprisonment rather than malicious prosecution);
Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. 390, 402 (1852) (Taney,
C.J.) (noting that an action against a naval officer
who ordered a marine private put in irons for
failing to perform his duty had “no analogy to a suit
for a malicious prosecution” because no legal
process had issued); Colter v. Lower, 35 Ind. 285,
286–87 (1871); Southern R. Co. v. Shirley, 90 S.W.
597, 599 (Ky. 1906); Roberts v. Thomas, 135 Ky. 63,
64 (1909); Broughton v. State, 335 N.E.2d 310, 314–
15 (N.Y. 1975).
An Illinois court noted in 1896, “[A]t common
law a claim to recover damages for false
imprisonment, in which the form of action was
trespass, could not be joined with a claim to recover
for malicious prosecution, in which the form of
action was trespass on the case.” Mexican C.R. Co.
v. Gehr, 66 Ill. App. 173, 179 (1896). Starting in
1848 and rapidly thereafter, however, code
pleading replaced common law pleading in many
states. See C. Hepburn, The Historical Development
of Code Pleading in America and England 92–115
(1897). By the time Congress enacted § 1983, a
substantial number of states permitted plaintiffs to
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file false imprisonment and malicious prosecution
claims together. See, e.g., Doyle v. Russell, 30 Barb.
300 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1859) (counts for false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution joined);
Bauer v. Clay, 8 Kan. 580, 584 (1871) (“Under our
Code where a party has a cause of action containing
all the elements of both malicious prosecution and
false imprisonment, as understood at common law,
he . . . may prosecute for his whole cause of
action.”); Krug v. Ward, 77 Ill. 603, 605 (1875)
(upholding the joinder of malicious prosecution and
false imprisonment claims); Williams v. Planters’
Ins. Co., 57 Miss. 759, 764 (1880) (characterizing as
“absurd” the “refinements of the common law
pleaders in their subtle distinctions between
trespass vi et armis and case”); Marks v. Townsend,
97 N.Y. 590, 594 (1885) (declaring that actions for
malicious prosecution and false imprisonment may
be joined in the same complaint “and it has been
common practice to unite them”).
D.

TWO VIEWS OF THIS CASE
1.

The Majority View: An Invalid Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause Does Not
Bring an Unlawful Seizure to an End

In Wallace, this Court noted, “We have never
explored the contours of a Fourth Amendment
malicious-prosecution suit under § 1983 . . . and we
do not do so here.” 549 U.S. at 390 n.2. This
language invited lower courts to consider whether
someone detained pursuant to legal process may
bring a “Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution
suit under § 1983.” Nine courts of appeals have now
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allowed suits to recover damages for wrongful
detention following the issuance of legal process. 5
D.C. Circuit: Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 F.3d
494, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“We join the large majority of
circuits in holding that malicious prosecution is actionable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the extent that the defendant’s
actions cause the plaintiff to be unreasonably ‘seized’ without
probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
First Circuit: Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 99–
100 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[W]e join our sister circuits in concluding
that the Fourth Amendment protection against seizure but
upon probable cause does not end when an arrestee becomes
held pursuant to legal process.”). Second Circuit: Swartz v.
Insogna, 704 F.3d 105, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The elements
of a malicious prosecution claim under section 1983 are
derived from applicable state law. . . . Additionally, . . . to be
actionable under section 1983 there must be a postarraignment seizure, the claim being grounded ultimately on
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable
seizures.”). Third Circuit: Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161
F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he constitutional violation is
the deprivation of liberty accompanying the prosecution.”).
Fourth Circuit: Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th
Cir. 2012) (“A ‘malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is
properly understood as a Fourth Amendment claim for
unreasonable seizure which incorporates certain elements of
the common law tort.’”) (quoting Lambert v. Williams, 223
F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 2000)). Sixth Circuit: Webb v. United
States, 789 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Freedom from
malicious prosecution is a clearly established Fourth
Amendment right.”). Ninth Circuit: Lacey v. Maricopa
County, 693 F.3d 896, 919 (9th Cir. 2012) (“To claim malicious
prosecution [under § 1983], a petitioner must allege ‘that the
defendants prosecuted her with malice and without probable
cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying her of
equal protection or another specific constitutional right.’”)
(quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189
5
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In addressing the question posed by Wallace,
some courts have noted that the term “Fourth
Amendment malicious-prosecution suit” can be
confusing. See, e.g., Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d
939, 953–54 (5th Cir. 2003) (declaring that Fourth
Amendment claims “are not claims for malicious
prosecution and labeling them as such only invites
confusion”); Parish v. City of Chicago, 594 F.3d 551,
554 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]here is nothing but
confusion gained by calling [a] legal theory
[brought under the Fourth or any other
amendment]
‘malicious
prosecution.’”).
The
confusion arises from the fact that the common-law
tort and the constitutional provision address
different injuries. Malicious prosecution can occur
even when a wrongly prosecuted person has not
been seized, and a seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment can occur even when a wrongly seized
person has not been prosecuted. See Gerstein, 420
U.S. at 118–19 (1975) (“In holding that the
prosecutor’s assessment of probable cause is not
(9th Cir. 1995)). Tenth Circuit: Sanchez v. Hartley, 810 F.3d
750, 755 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e have repeatedly recognized a
cause of action under § 1983 for malicious prosecution under
the Fourth Amendment.”). Eleventh Circuit: Grider v. City
of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010) (“To establish
a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must prove
two things: (1) the elements of the common law tort of
malicious prosecution; and (2) a violation of his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.”).
The Eighth Circuit has not resolved the question. See
Harrington v. City of Council Bluffs, 678 F.3d 676, 679–80
(8th Cir. 2012).
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sufficient alone to justify restraint of liberty
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is
entitled to judicial oversight or review of the
decision to prosecute.”) (emphasis added); Albright,
510 U.S. at 281–82 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that the plaintiff’s complaint
concerned, not the seizure of his person, “but
instead the malicious initiation of a baseless
criminal prosecution against him” and that “[t]he
specific provisions of the Bill of rights [do not]
impose a standard for the initiation of a
prosecution”).
Despite the confusion it may engender, the term
“Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution suit”
can be useful. The common law tort, although
concerned with the commencement of legal
proceedings, allowed recovery for the detention that
might follow this event. It thus remedied some but
not all of the detention that might now violate the
Fourth Amendment. For example, Elijah Manuel
might have been able to show prior to the dismissal
of the criminal charge against him that he was
detained without probable cause. Until the charge
was dismissed, however, he could not have
established an element of common-law malicious
prosecution, a termination of the criminal
proceedings in his favor. 6 The authors of § 1983

A plaintiff who could prove what is now a Fourth
Amendment violation also might be unable to establish
malice. See, e.g., Farmer v. Darling, 98 Eng. Rep. 27, 28 (K.B.
1766) (“[M]alice . . . and the want of probable cause must both
6
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might not have meant to authorize Manuel’s
recovery before he could prove the elements of the
common-law tort. They might have assumed that
recovery under § 1983 would be limited in the same
way that common-law recovery had been limited. If
that were so, it would make sense to refer to a
“Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution suit”
and to distinguish it from a “Fourth Amendment
false-arrest suit.” In this case, Manuel seeks
damages for post-process detention in violation of
the Fourth Amendment that the common law
would have made actionable prior to the enactment
of § 1983. He thus brings a Fourth Amendment
malicious prosecution suit.
The courts of appeals that would allow Manuel’s
recovery are divided about whether a plaintiff must
establish the elements of the common-law tort. As
the First Circuit explained,
The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits
have
adopted
a
purely
constitutional approach, requiring the
plaintiff to demonstrate only a Fourth
Amendment violation. The Second, Third,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, on the other
hand,
have
adopted
a
blended
constitutional/common
law
approach,
requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate a
Fourth Amendment violation and all the

concur.”); Dobbs, supra, § 433 (noting differences between
malice and the absence of probable cause).
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elements of a common law malicious
prosecution claim.
Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 99 (1st
Cir. 2013). 7
Just as the courts that recognize a Fourth
Amendment malicious prosecution suit under
§ 1983 differ about what elements a plaintiff must
establish, they conceptualize the underlying Fourth
Amendment violation somewhat differently. The
Sixth Circuit has said, “[T]he gravamen of the
complaint is continued detention without probable
cause.” Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725,
748 (6th Cir. 2006).
This position echoes that of four Justices of this
Court in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994). In
Albright, as in this case, the criminal case against
the plaintiff was dismissed prior to trial. Although
the plaintiff did not “claim a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights,” id. at 271, Justice Ginsburg
suggested in a concurring opinion that a Fourth
Amendment claim would have been viable. She
wrote that the seizure of a person continues until
this person is “freed from the state’s control.” Id. at
Most courts of appeals seem not to have noticed, but
this Court has largely resolved the apparent conflict described
in Hernandez-Cuevas. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1985),
considers whether a plaintiff alleging post-process detention
in violation of the Fourth Amendment must establish
common-law malice. It holds that, although he need not, he
must establish a close substitute. Id. at 341. Heck, 512 U.S. at
486–90, holds that this plaintiff must establish a termination
of the criminal proceedings in his favor.
7
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278 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Souter
similarly concluded that the protections of the
Fourth Amendment continued beyond the issuance
of legal process. Id. at 289–90 (Souter, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Blackmun, also declared that “the initial seizure of
petitioner continued until his discharge.” Id. at 307
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Because the plaintiff had
presented no Fourth Amendment claim, the other
members of the Court did not address the question.
Most courts that have recognized a Fourth
Amendment malicious prosecution claim under the
Fourth
Amendment
have
envisioned
the
constitutional violation somewhat differently. They
view holding a person for trial and imposing
pretrial restraints on his liberty as a seizure
distinct from the initial arrest. See Gallo v. City of
Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1998)
(“[T]he constitutional violation is the deprivation of
liberty accompanying the prosecution.”); Britton v.
Maloney, 196 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1999) (“For a
state actor to violate the Fourth Amendment by
initiating malicious prosecution against someone,
the criminal charges at issue must have imposed
some deprivation of liberty . . . .”).
This Court’s decisions recognize that extending
or augmenting an existing restraint on liberty can
constitute a seizure. For example, this Court treats
an arrest following a Terry stop as a distinct
seizure although the arrestee’s liberty already has
been restrained. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675, 682–88 (1985); see also Rodriguez v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015)
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(treating the unreasonable extension of a traffic
stop as a Fourth Amendment violation).
2.

The Minority View: The Fourth Amendment
Vanishes When Invalid Legal Process
Issues

When the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal
of Manuel’s § 1983 action, it relied on its recent
decision in Llovet v. City of Chicago, 761 F.3d 759
(7th Cir. 2014). In Llovet, the court found an
“implication” in decisions of this Court
that once detention by reason of arrest
turns into detention by reason of
arraignment—once police action gives way
to legal process—the Fourth Amendment
falls out of the picture and the detainee’s
claim that detention is improper becomes a
claim of malicious prosecution violative of
due process. If this is right, the doctrine of
“continuing seizure” is wrong, as we held,
for example, in Wiley v. City of Chicago,
361 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2004), which
states that our court has “repeatedly
rejected the ‘continuing seizure approach,”
instead holding “that the scope of a Fourth
Amendment claim is limited up to the point
of arraignment.” To the same effect is
Hernandez v. Sheahan, [455 F.3d 772, 777
(7th Cir. 2006)]: “the fourth amendment
drops out of the picture following a person’s
initial appearance in court.”
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Id. at 763. 8
One court of appeals other than the Seventh
Circuit has endorsed the “vanishing Fourth
Amendment” position. The Fifth Circuit, however,
left uncertain when the amendment evaporates. In
Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 959 (5th Cir.
2003), it held that “the umbrella of the Fourth
Amendment, broad and powerful as it is, casts its
protection solely over the pretrial events of a
prosecution.” The court reserved the question
whether the Fourth Amendment might still cast its
protection over the period following a judicial
officer’s determination of probable cause but before
the beginning of a trial.
PART II
ARGUMENT
A.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S “VANISHING
FOURTH AMENDMENT” VIEW IS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT AND
HISTORY
OF
THE
FOURTH
AMENDMENT

Although the Seventh Circuit has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment “falls out of

Although Llovet spoke of “a claim of malicious
prosecution violative of due process,” the Seventh Circuit has
held that an adequate state remedy for malicious prosecution
satisfies all due process requirements and thereby “knocks out
any constitutional tort of malicious prosecution.” Newsome,
256 F.3d at 751; cf. Albright, 510 U.S. at 281–86 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
8
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the picture” when legal process issues, it has
offered little explanation of this position. The
court’s earliest articulation of its view appears to be
a statement in Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190 (7th
Cir. 1989), in which the plaintiff sought damages
for an interrogation at gunpoint that occurred after
his arrest but before his arraignment. According to
the court, the difficulty with the plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment claim was that he
had already been seized. He was seized
when he was arrested. A natural although
not inevitable interpretation of the word
“seizure” would limit it to the initial act of
seizing, with the result that subsequent
events would be deemed to have occurred
after rather than during the seizure. Now
once an arrested person is charged but
before he is convicted, the question
whether the fact, manner, or duration of
his
continued
confinement
is
unconstitutional passes over from the
Fourth Amendment to the due process
clause. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.).
Id. at 192–93.
The court supported its assertion that the
Fourth Amendment vanishes when an arrestee is
arraigned by citing Johnson v. Glick, but this
opinion did not support its statement in any way.
Judge Friendly wrote in a case that did not present
any Fourth Amendment issue at all, and his
opinion mentioned the Fourth Amendment only to
say,
“[B]oth
before
and
after
sentence,
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constitutional protection against police brutality is
not limited to conduct violating the specific
command of the Eighth Amendment or . . . of the
Fourth.” Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1032.
Before concluding that the Fourth Amendment
vanishes, the Seventh Circuit pointed to the
amendment’s text. As it observed, one could
plausibly read the word “seizure” to refer only to
the initial apprehension of a suspect—something
that happens in a moment—and not to include any
detention following this person’s arrest. Even
acknowledging that the seizure of a person
continues until he is arraigned, however, rejects
this interpretation and endorses a concept of a
(briefly) continuing seizure. Like the Seventh
Circuit, this Court has held that a Fourth
Amendment seizure continues at least until legal
process issues. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389–90.
The issue in this case is not whether a seizure
continues but how long, and the Seventh Circuit
offered little reason for vaporizing the Fourth
Amendment at the moment it chose—the moment
of arraignment. The most natural answer to the
question how long a seizure lasts is “until it ends,”
and courts sometimes have spoken of the duration
of a seizure in the same way as the rest of us. See,
e.g., Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. 342, 359 (1842)
(Story, J.) (“If a seizure [of property] has been
actually made, and is a continuing seizure; it is no
bar to proceedings thereon, that the cause of
forfeiture relied on is not the same upon which the
seizure was originally made.”); Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 584 (1952)
(“[T]he District Court . . . issued a preliminary
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injunction restraining
the
Secretary
from
‘continuing the seizure . . . .’”); Dockham v. New
Orleans, 26 La. Ann. 302, 303 (La. 1874) (noting
that a seizure of property did not lapse after
seventy days as one party contended but continued
in accordance with the law); Stilphen v. Ulmer, 33
A. 980, 985 (Me. 1895) (“His arrest continued for
the space of 12 hours.”).
The Seventh Circuit most recently explained its
distinctive position in Llovet v. City of Chicago, 761
F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2014). Pointing once more to the
amendment’s text, it wrote, “There is a difference
between seizing a person and not letting him go. .
. . When, after the arrest or seizure, a person is not
let go when he should be, the Fourth Amendment
gives way to the due process clause as a basis for
challenging his detention.” Id. at 764.
Of course every moment following a person’s
wrongful arrest can be characterized as one in
which he is “not let go when he should be.” As
noted above, an arrest at the conclusion of a Terry
stop is not seen as a “failure to let go” governed by
the Due Process Clause. It is instead a seizure
governed by the Fourth Amendment. The Seventh
Circuit offered no reason for focusing only on the
moment a judicial officer should have let the
wrongly arrested person go. 9
Even if the constitutional term “seizure” referred only
to the initial moment of apprehension, the injury resulting
from a seizure would include later detention. This Court has
said that § 1983 “should be read against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
9
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Llovet hinted at a historical rather than a
textual argument for its view of the Fourth
Amendment when it wrote, “The tort of false arrest
is the common law counterpart to an unreasonable
seizure, forbidden by the Fourth Amendment.” 761
F.3d at 763. 10 Perhaps the Seventh Circuit
imagined that the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment intended to provide a remedy only for
wrongs that constituted false imprisonment at
common law and not for wrongs that constituted
malicious prosecution. That assumption, however,
would have been erroneous. Our forebears did not
mean the Fourth Amendment to vanish when legal
process issued.
An arrest warrant constitutes legal process. See
Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 191 (1892) (discussing
an arrest “without warrant or other legal process”);
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389 (“[T]he allegations before
us arise from respondents’ detention of petitioner
consequences of his actions.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
187 (1961). In both Innocent Plaintiff’s case and Elijah
Manuel’s, detention following a judicial determination of
probable cause was not only foreseeable at the time the
plaintiff was apprehended, it was foreseen and intended. A
determination of probable cause might break the causal
chain, but only when this determination rested on evidence
other than that fabricated by the arresting officer. In the
absence of such a break, the initial seizure would remain the
cause of the detention.
Ironically, the tort of false imprisonment can be
committed by a failure to let go, as when a jailer fails to
release an inmate whose term is up. See Dobbs, supra, at
§ 38.
10
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without legal process in January 1994. They did not
have a warrant for his arrest.”); Singer v. Fulton
County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 1995) (in a
malicious prosecution suit, “‘legal process’ will be
either in the form of a warrant . . . or a subsequent
arraignment”); Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354, 361
(7th Cir. 2003) (“A warrant is legal process, and so
a complaint about conduct pursuant to it is a
challenge to legal process and thus resembles
malicious prosecution.”); Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d
1254, 1257 (10th Cir. 2009) (“An arrest warrant
and the probable cause determination by a judicial
officer after a warrantless arrest are essentially the
same legal process, except that one occurs prior to
arrest and the other occurs after.”); see also Part I–
C supra (noting that, at the Framing, a plaintiff
challenging an arrest pursuant to a warrant was
required to establish the elements of malicious
prosecution).
The principal object of the Fourth Amendment
was to outlaw abuses of legal process and to
prevent oppressive searches and seizures of the sort
judges had previously authorized. The Framers
spoke to judges, not police officers, when they
wrote, “[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const.,
Amdt. 4. Declaring that the Fourth Amendment
vanishes when legal process issues would lead to
the astonishing conclusion that an arrest following
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the issuance of an arrest warrant cannot violate the
Fourth Amendment. The Framers would have
shuddered at the idea. 11
The Fourth Amendment’s warrants clause
enshrined in the Constitution three landmark
English decisions of the 1760s that held general
warrants unlawful. See Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng.
Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763); Entick v. Carrington, 19
Howell’s St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765); Leach v. Money,
97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1765). In a recent,
authoritative study titled The Original Fourth
Amendment, Professor Donohue notes that a
“systematic assault on general warrants” began in
England more than 100 years before these
decisions. The chief architect of this assault was Sir
Edward Coke, previously the Chief Justice of the
Court of King’s Bench. Donohue, The Original
Fourth Amendment, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2016),
available
at
http://scholarship.law.
georgetown.edu/facpub/1616/.
Coke himself had been seized pursuant to a
general warrant in 1621. In 1628, he complained to
Parliament not only about his arrest and the
unlawful search of his papers but also about the
post-arrest detention the invalid warrant produced.
“I was committed to the Tower and all my books
and study searched . . . . I was inquired after what I
had done all my life before.” Donohue, supra, at 21
This Court has never doubted that an arrest pursuant
to a warrant can violate the amendment. See, e.g., Whiteley v.
Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564–65 (1971).
11
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(quoting Coke to Parliament, Committee of the
Whole House, Proceedings and Debates, ff. 100–
100v, in CD, III, 149–51 (Apr. 29, 1628), in 3 E.
Coke, Selected Writings of Sir Edward Coke 58
(Steve Sheppard, ed. 2003)). Coke also declared, “If
we agree to this imprisonment ‘for matters of state’
and ‘a convenient time,’ we shall leave Magna
Carta and the other statutes and make them
fruitless, and do what our ancestors would never
do.” Id. at 21–22 (quoting Coke to Parliament,
Committee of the Whole House, Proceedings and
Debates, f. 99, in CD, III, 94–96 (Apr. 26, 1628), in
Coke, supra, at 55–56)).
The Framers would have seen Coke’s post-legal
process detention as inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment, and neither the Seventh Circuit nor
anyone else has offered a reason to believe they
meant to treat legal process following a warrantless
arrest (as in Manuel’s case) differently from legal
process preceding an arrest (as in Coke’s case). It is
difficult to conceive of a reason why anyone would
endorse this distinction.
One guesses that the Framers would have been
appalled by the thought that “once police action
gives way to legal process[,] the Fourth
Amendment falls out of the picture.” A wrongful
arrest deprives a person of what Blackstone called
an “absolute right[] . . . vested in [him] by the
immutable law of nature”— the right of personal
liberty. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *124. “This
personal liberty consists in the power of . . .
removing one’s person to whatsoever place one’s
own inclination may direct; without imprisonment
or restraint unless by due course of law.” Id. at

30
*134. The denial of this “absolute” right continues
until a wrongly detained person is released.
B.

THIS COURT’S DECISIONS REJECT
THE
“VANISHING
FOURTH
AMENDMENT” VIEW

Just as the Seventh Circuit’s position cannot be
reconciled with the text or history of the Fourth
Amendment, it cannot be reconciled with Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Gerstein requires a
judicial order as a prerequisite to an extended
restraint on liberty pending trial, and the restraint
authorized by an order follows the order itself.
Gerstein holds that the Fourth Amendment
protects against unwarranted detention throughout
the pretrial period, the period at issue in this case.
The protection of the Fourth Amendment does not
“drop out” when legal process issues.
The Seventh Circuit’s position is also
inconsistent with this Court’s § 1983 decisions. The
question on which the Court granted certiorari in
this case is “whether an individual’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizures continues beyond legal process so as to
allow a malicious prosecution claim based upon the
Fourth Amendment.” Petition for Cert., p. i. The
opinion of the Court in Wallace invited this
phrasing of the question, for the Court wrote: “We
have never explored the contours of a Fourth
Amendment malicious-prosecution suit under
§ 1983 . . . and we do not do so here.” 549 U.S. at
390 n.2. Wallace’s dictum, however, was inaccurate.
This Court has “explored the contours of a Fourth
Amendment malicious-prosecution suit under
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§ 1983.” In fact, it already has resolved the
question on which it granted certiorari in this case.
As noted above, an arrest warrant constitutes
legal process. This warrant supplies the
determination of probable cause necessary to
justify an extended restraint on liberty prior to
trial. When a judge has issued a warrant before an
arrest, no “arraignment,” “initial appearance,” or
“Gerstein hearing” need be held following the
arrest. Gerstein itself noted the equivalence of prearrest and post-arrest determinations of probable
cause. 420 U.S. at 125 (declaring that the
determination of probable cause “must be made by
a judicial officer either before or promptly after
arrest”). Shortly after Gerstein, this Court noted,
“Since an adversary hearing is not required [when
a judicial determination of probable cause follows
an arrest], and since the probable-cause standard
for pretrial detention is the same as that for arrest,
a person arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by
magistrate on a showing of probable cause is not
constitutionally entitled to a separate judicial
determination that there is probable cause to
detain him pending trial.” Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 143 (1979).
This Court first held that “an individual’s
Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures continues beyond legal
process so as to allow a malicious prosecution claim
based upon the Fourth Amendment” in Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). The plaintiffs in
Malley were taken into custody after legal process
issued; they were arrested pursuant to two
warrants. Following their arrests, they were
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booked, held several hours, arraigned, and
released. The charges against them were dismissed
when a grand jury refused to return an indictment.
The plaintiffs then filed suit under § 1983
against the police officer who had procured the
warrants, alleging that the evidence he presented
to the issuing judge fell short of establishing
probable cause. Id. at 338–39. A federal district
court dismissed their complaint, declaring “that the
act of the judge in issuing the warrants . . . broke
the causal chain” between the police officer’s
presentation and the plaintiffs’ arrests. Id. The
district court also said that, because the police
officer believed the facts he presented to the judge,
he might be immune from suit. Id. at 339. Both the
First Circuit and this Court ordered the plaintiffs’
complaint reinstated.
Because the police officer claimed absolute
immunity from suit, the Court began its analysis
by asking whether the common law would have
afforded him immunity at the time § 1983 was
enacted. It answered this question no, observing
that the officer would have been subject to a suit
for malicious prosecution:
In 1871, the generally accepted rule was
that one who procured the issuance of an
arrest warrant by submitting a complaint
could be held liable if the complaint was
made maliciously and without probable
cause. Given malice and the lack of
probable cause, the complainant enjoyed no
immunity.
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Id. at 340–41. The Court cited several nineteenthcentury malicious prosecution decisions and a
nineteenth-century treatise to support this
conclusion.
Malley departed from the common law in one
respect. The Court did not require the plaintiffs to
prove the officer’s subjective malice. Instead, it
reiterated the objective standard it had established
for overcoming an officer’s qualified immunity in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982).
The plaintiffs would be required to show that “no
reasonably competent officer would have concluded
that a warrant should issue.” Malley, 475 U.S. at
341. The Court declared that this standard
“sufficiently serves [the same] goal” as the common
law’s requirement of malice. Id. The Court thus
looked to the common law to shape but not define
the constitutional tort created by § 1983. Cf. Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257–58 (1978) (observing
that although “common law rules, defining the
elements of damages and the prerequisites for their
recovery, provide the starting point for inquiry
under § 1983,” these rules may not “provide a
complete solution”).
In Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997), the
Court unanimously reiterated its holding in Malley.
Although prosecutors generally are absolutely
immune from suit, Kalina allowed recovery under
§ 1983 from a prosecutor who made false
statements in an affidavit for an arrest warrant.
The Court once more held that “an individual’s
Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures continues beyond legal
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process so as to allow a malicious prosecution claim
based upon the Fourth Amendment.”
In the present case, an invalid judicial
determination of probable cause followed an
unlawful arrest; in Malley and Kalina, it came
before.
This
difference
was
unimportant
historically, and there appears to be no reason why
it should matter today. The difference in timing
does not in any way distinguish the two cases.
Section 1983 and the Fourth Amendment permit
recovery from an officer for an unlawful deprivation
of liberty that he has persuaded an erring judge to
approve; the Fourth Amendment does not “drop
out” when legal process issues. Malley and Kalina
are on point in this case.
Indeed, because police officers should be
encouraged to seek warrants before making
arrests, it would be backwards to cut off the
recovery of a suspect arrested without a warrant
but not the recovery of a suspect arrested pursuant
to a warrant. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113 (noting
the Court’s “preference for the use of arrest
warrants when feasible”); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 96 (1964) (“An arrest without a warrant
bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective
predetermination
of
probable
cause,
and
substitutes the far less reliable procedure of an
after-the-event justification . . . .”). As noted above,
there need be no “Gerstein hearing” when a suspect
is arrested pursuant to a warrant. In the absence of
such a hearing, Malley and Kalina allow this
suspect to recover damages for the full period of his
unlawful pretrial confinement. This suspect’s right
to recover is not limited by the issuance of legal
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process, something that occurred before his arrest.
Allowing this suspect to recover fully while limiting
the recovery of a suspect arrested without a
warrant and later subjected to legal process looks
upside down. Cutting off this second suspect’s
recovery at the moment of his arraignment protects
the officer who has acted without a warrant from
the liability Malley and Kalina impose on an officer
who has sought a judge’s approval.
CONCLUSION
A NOTE ON UN-EXONERATED PLAINTIFFS
When a common-law plaintiff could not
establish the elements of malicious prosecution, he
could recover only for whatever unlawful detention
preceded the issuance of legal process. For him, the
pre-process, post-process line mattered.
A hypothetical case illustrates the limits of the
recovery the common law afforded: Officer Rogue
arrests Guilty Plaintiff (Innocent Plaintiff’s
brother) without probable cause on the basis of
fabricated evidence. A search incident to the arrest
reveals truthful evidence that leads to Guilty
Plaintiff’s detention before trial and then to his
conviction and imprisonment. While serving his
sentence, Guilty Plaintiff uncovers evidence of
Officer Rogue’s misconduct. Still imprisoned, he
files a § 1983 action, alleging that his
imprisonment was a foreseeable and intended
consequence of Officer Rogue’s violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
Unlike Innocent Plaintiff, Guilty Plaintiff could
not have recovered at common law for his post-
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legal-process detention. He could not have
established an element of malicious prosecution, a
termination of the criminal proceedings in his
favor.
At common law, moreover, not every favorable
termination of the criminal proceedings would do.
Even if Guilty Plaintiff’s conviction and sentence
had been vacated on procedural grounds, recovery
would be barred. See Dobbs, supra, § 434 (“An
acquittal of the accused . . . is of course a
termination favorable to the accused. Short of that,
courts have looked for dispositions that tend to
show the accused’s innocence or at least a
determination that a criminal case could not be
proved, saying with Prosser that a mere procedural
victory would not suffice.”); J. Townshend, A
Treatise on the Wrongs Called Slander and Libel
§ 423 at 704 (3th ed. 1877) (“It is certain that the
termination should be such as to furnish prima
facie evidence that the prosecution was unfounded,
and was terminated on account of the plaintiff’s
innocence, or at least was in favor of the plaintiff.”).
As noted in Part I–D–1 above, some of the
courts of appeals that afford a § 1983 remedy for
post-process detention in violation of the Fourth
Amendment require a plaintiff to establish only the
Fourth Amendment violation. Others require a
plaintiff to establish not only this violation but also
all the elements of the common-law tort. The
conflict is less significant than one might imagine
because Heck independently bars Guilty Plaintiff’s
recovery. In Heck, this Court analogized all § 1983
actions challenging the validity of a conviction or
sentence to common law actions for malicious
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prosecution, and it applied the common law’s
favorable-termination requirement to all of them.
512 U.S. at 485–90.
The issues posed by a plaintiff who alleges a
violation of his constitutional rights although a
common-law doctrine would have blocked his
recovery are challenging, but these issues are not
currently before the Court. The issue before it is
whether the Fourth Amendment should vanish
upon the issuance of legal process when this
process would not have blocked the plaintiff’s
recovery at common law. This issue is easy.
The Seventh Circuit’s view that the Fourth
Amendment disappears when legal process issues
is inconsistent with history, with the text of the
amendment, and with Gerstein. Moreover, in
Malley and Kalina, this Court ruled that an
individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable seizures continues beyond legal
process so as to allow a malicious prosecution claim
based on the Fourth Amendment. The Court has
already decided this case.
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